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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been a tremendous honor both to address the 2nd Israeli
Defense Forces Conference on the Law of Armed Conflict and to
provide this Article. My goal is to provide more detail on my views
regarding organized armed groups I under International
Humanitarian Law, which I will refer to as the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC). While I am not an academic, I hope to provide the practical
perspective that comes from implementing LOAC rules during real-
world operations. My perspective also comes from recognizing the need
to apply these rules across a broad spectrum of operations: in the air,
on the ground, at sea, in both urban and remote areas, and in future
conflicts that might not resemble today's fight.
Let me begin by emphasizing that the United States is absolutely
committed to complying with the LOAC during all military operations.
The United States has devoted more time, training, and personnel to
this vital task than any other nation in the history of warfare. To help
our commanders comply with the LOAC, I typically apply a three-part
framework when I provide legal advice on a proposal to attack any
person.
In this Article, I will describe the three questions I ask and
highlight some of the practical problems that can arise when we
answer each of the three questions. After that, I will move on to a
discussion of how organized armed groups are treated under the
1. Because this article extensively discusses the ICRC's INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, I have used the term "organized armed group" for
clarity. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 31
(Nils Melzer ed., 2009) [hereinafter ICRC DPH STUDY]. The Department of Defense
generally uses the term "armed group" in order to avoid confusing the requirement of
organization that groups must have in order to be considered lawful combatants and
whether groups are sufficiently organized for the purposes of determining whether the
group is liable to attack. One of the LOAC requirements for armed groups to be
considered lawful combatants is that they have sufficient discipline and command
mechanisms like a traditional military chain-of-command. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T
OF DEF. LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 4.6.3 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAw OF WAR
MANUAL]; cf. id. § 19.20.2.2 (explaining the requirements that groups must meet to be
covered by certain provisions of the Geneva Convention). On the other hand, this
requirement of lawful combatant status does not apply when assessing whether armed
groups may be subject to attack as unprivileged belligerents.
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LOAC, and how that treatment is-and should remain-different from
how civilians are treated when they directly participate in hostilities.
I consider this distinction to be the most important part of the
discussion about targeting persons in today's conflicts, but I note that
this key concept is sometimes misunderstood or misapplied, so it plays
a prominent role in my presentation.
II. THREE-PART FRAMEWORK FOR ATTACKING PEOPLE
When describing this three-part framework for targeting a
person-or making a person the object of attack, to use the LOAC
term2-I am drawing on my experience serving as the Staff Judge
Advocate for the U.S. Central Command,.(CENTCOM). Even though
the United States was engaged in a number of non-international armed
conflicts during my time at CENTCOM, 3 I think that this three-part
framework would be relevant for international armed conflicts as well.
When conducting combat operations during an armed conflict, a
commander will conduct the Joint Targeting Process to select targets
to attack.4 Some of those targets will be people. Before attacking, the
commander must determine whether those people are subject to attack
under the LOAC. 5 To advise the commander in making that decision,
I use a three-part framework. Before applying this three-part
framework, I begin by treating all persons as if they are not subject to
attack unless we establish otherwise.6
I then apply our three-part framework to determine whether a
person is subject to attack. First, I ask whether the person is a member
of the armed forces. Second, I ask whether the person is a member of
an organized armed group. Finally, I ask whether the person is directly
2. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.1.
3. U.S. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL
SECURITY OPERATIONS 2-12, 15-18 (2016) [hereinafter REPORT ON LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORKS].
4. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS at 111-26 (Jan.
17, 2017).
5. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.4.2.
6. There has been much discussion about whether LOAC requires a
presumption that persons have a civilian status in case of "doubt." See id. § 5.4.3.2;
Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Sec'y of Def., Review of the 1977 First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (May 3, 1985). I do not mean to
imply a formal legal presumption in case of "doubt" as found in the Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I], which the United States has not accepted. Instead, I simply mean
that our analysis reflects the practical reality that in order to attack, a commander must
have a good-faith, reasonable belief that a person or object is subject to attack under
LOAC. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.3, 5.10.2.2. Practically speaking,
that means that U.S. forces do not attack until they believe that standard is met.
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participating in hostilities. In general, if the answer to any one of these
questions is "yes," then the person will be subject to attack. If the
answer to all three questions is "no," then the person may not be
attacked.
A. Members of State Armed Forces
This is the simplest of the three concepts. If an individual is
wearing a military uniform or carrying a military ID card, we all know
he or she generally may be killed 24/7 even, as Professor Yoram
Dinstein noted, while asleep in his or her bed.7
The rule that members of the armed forces are generally subject
to attack obviously applies to front-line infantry fighters, pilots, and
other members of the armed forces who directly participate in
hostilities. However, the rule is very broad because it is focused on
membership, not conduct-it is not tied to the rule governing civilians
who directly participate in hostilities.8 Before we continue, we should
stop and consider just how broad this rule is. Although there are
limited exceptions, such as for military medical and religious personnel
and persons hors de combat, commanders may generally attack all
members of the enemy's armed forces, including rear-echelon support
personnel.9 In order to illustrate this important point, I provide the
following examples of roles performed by uniformed members of the
US armed forces:
* Supply / Logistics Specialists
* Human Resource Managers
* Military Truck Drivers
* Public Affairs Officers
* Finance Clerks
* Cooks
* Computer Experts / IT Professionals
* Military Musicians
* Military Researchers who Develop / Test Munitions and Drone
Technology
* Communications Experts
* Civil Affairs Officers
* And last but not least, Lawyers!
7. Yoram Dinstein, Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University, Keynote Address
at The Second Israel Defense Forces International Conference on the Law of Armed
Conflict (Apr. 25, 2017); see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.7.1.
8. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.8; see also Additional Protocol
I, supra note 6, art. 51; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 13, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol ll].
9. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.7; see ICRC DPH STUDY, supra
note 1, at 20-24, 27-31.
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Few of these uniformed personnel could be described as directly
participating in hostilities as that phrase is understood when applying
it to civilians, yet all may be attacked by virtue of their membership in
the armed forces. It is likely that organized armed groups have similar
categories of support personnel.
B. Members of Organized Armed Groups
When states are engaged in a non-international armed conflict
against organized armed groups, members of those organized armed
groups may also be attacked, just like members of the armed forces.1 0
However, this analysis presents some legal and practical challenges.
1. Which Groups Qualify as Organized Armed Groups?
As the name implies, the group must be both organized and
armed. To be organized, the group must have some structure and
cohesion. The group must also have some command mechanism that
allows the group to execute direction from leaders, though it need not
look like a traditional military chain of command. A key consideration
is whether the armed group is sufficiently cohesive so that we can
impute an intention to wage war to the armed group as a whole."
The group must also be armed. This does not mean each member
must be armed, but it does mean that the group as a whole must
generally conduct hostile or belligerent activities-using violence to
achieve its objectives, analogous to a state's armed forces. In some
cases, if a nonstate actor includes both an armed group and a political
organization, and those elements can be distinguished, then the
political organization might not be part of the armed group. These
analyses all require intelligence information about the nonstate actor.
In case there is any doubt, the United States views ISIS and al-
Qaeda as armed groups whose members are subject to attack.12 But as
an Israeli Brigade Commander in the Golan Heights noted,13 there are
many rebel bands or armed factions operating across Syria, and some
of them do not appear to be sufficiently organized to qualify as
"organized armed groups." These entities might be more accurately
characterized as movements or loose criminal gangs rather than
organized armed groups.
For the United States, the question of whether an organized
armed group is a party to a particular non-international armed conflict
10. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, .§ 5.7.3.
11. See id. § 5.7.1.
12. REPORT ON LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS, supra note 3, at 5.
13. Participants in the 2nd Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Conference on the Law
of Armed Conflict travelled to the Golan Heights and were briefed by an IDF Brigade
Commander who described a wide array of various groups operating in Syria.
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against the United States is dependent on the factual situation. This
question of international law is informed by US domestic law and US
policy.14
2. Identifying Members of Organized Armed Groups
Once we know which groups qualify, the second challenge is to
identify individual members of organized armed groups. Membership
may be determined through either formal or functional membership in
the organized armed group.15 Formal membership may be established
by indicia such as a rank or title, an oath, a uniform, or a document
that indicates that a person has formally joined the organized armed
group.16 Functional membership exists where a person is functionally
integrated into the group.'7 This may include the performance of roles
within the organized armed group that parallel the roles of members
of state armThd forces, such as infantry fighters or logistics officers.
Because the concept of "membership" in nonstate armed groups can be
formal or functional, the Department of Defense (DoD) will often refer
to persons being "part of' or "belonging to" nonstate armed groups.'8
Identifying who is part of a group can be really challenging in
practice-especially when confronting a group like ISIS. Every once in
a while, members will fly an ISIS flag on their trucks, but generally
speaking, they do not wear uniforms to distinguish themselves from
civilians. In fact, they often try to hide their membership by blending
in with civilians. Therefore, commanders often require significant
intelligence to identify members of organized armed groups.
The United States and its coalition partners work hard to collect
and analyze intelligence that identifies members of organized armed
groups and distinguishes them from non-combatants. They also
develop targeting procedures that reflect care to ensure that only
enemy combatants are struck while seeking to minimize civilian
casualties. Minimizing civilian casualties is an important effort, and it
is quite challenging, particularly during combat in dense urban areas
like we have seen in Iraq and Syria.
When US forces identify individual members of an organized
armed group, they may lawfully attack them. And just like we
discussed with members of the armed forces, members of organized
armed groups (with similar exceptions for personnel such as medical
teams 19 and those hors de combat) may be targeted based on
14. REPORT ON LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS, supra note 3, at 3-11.
15. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.7.3.
16. See id. § 5.7.3.1.
17. Id. § 5.7.3.2.
18. See, e.g., id. § 4.18.4.1.
19. To be protected, medical and religious personnel must be exclusively engaged
in those humanitarian duties. Id. § 17.15.1.1. Most of the armed groups we face do not
have personnel exclusively engaged in such humanitarian duties.
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membership, even if their role is not to directly participate in
hostilities.
C. Civilians Who Directly Participate in Hostilities
If a person does not meet these two membership tests, he or she
generally would be regarded as a civilian.20 For example, both a person
affiliated with a roaming, disorganized band and a person you do not
have enough intelligence on to identify as a member of an organized
armed group must be treated as civilians. And civilians cannot be
attacked unless they directly participate in hostilities. So our third and
final step in our three-part process is to determine whether a person is
a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities.
When it comes to direct participation in hostilities, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) advocates for
requiring three elements to be met: (1) A specific act must reach the
required threshold of harm, (2) there must be a direct causal link
between the specific act and the harm likely to result, and (3) the act
must have a belligerent nexus.2 1 While I disagree with the test in some
areas (which I discuss in more detail below), there are two things that
make it a good starting point for discussion: its simplicity and the fact
that it sets a high standard. Both are important because the LOAC is
applied by young soldiers on battlefields who must often make
immediate life-or-death decisions, rather than by lawyers or professors
on university campuses with time to research each issue.
Therefore, I appreciate the simplicity of the ICRC's approach to
interpreting what constitutes direct participation in hostilities: you
may only attack a civilian when that civilian's action directly poses a
risk of some harm. I also appreciate that the ICRC's approach sets a
high standard-I think a narrow, high standard is appropriate to
protect civilians from being unnecessarily targeted. I also think a
narrow, high standard can be clear enough to be understood by an
eighteen-year-old private who is tired, hungry, and scared.
That does not mean that the ICRC standard is perfect, however. I
strongly disagree with the ICRC's assertion of a LOAC duty to capture
persons who are legitimate targets before making them the object of
attack.22 In addition, the ICRC's interpretation should better account
for people who have a pattern of direct participation in hostilities. The
ICRC's "revolving door" of protection for these individuals does not
accurately reflect the law of armed conflict.23 Finally, I think the test's
"one causal step" requirement for direct causation may be too limited
in some cases where the participant deliberately takes action intended
20. Id. § 4.8.1.5, 5.7.2.
21. ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 46-64.
22. Id. at 77-82.
23. Id. at 70-71.
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to contribute to military action.24 However, I think that, in general, the
ICRC interpretive guidance is a good starting point for determining
whether civilians are directly participating in hostilities.25
III. ORGANIZED ARMED GROUPS AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES
That said, some argue that the direct participation in hostilities
standard is good enough to replace the test for membership in
organized armed groups.26 I completely disagree with this approach,
and I would like to discuss three legal and practical reasons why it is
not appropriate.
Before we get started, it is important to identify exactly where the
disagreement lies. In 2009, the ICRC released its Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law (ICRC DPH Study).2 7 In the study,
the ICRC acknowledges that, in both international 28 and non-
international29 armed conflict, members of organized armed groups
may be attacked.3 0 The ICRC also acknowledges that these members
may be attacked at all times, twenty-four hours a day, so long as they
remain members.3 1
So far so good, but the ICRC and I part company when it comes
time to define the members of an organized armed group. For the
ICRC, members of the organized armed group are defined by "whether
a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or
her direct participation in hostilities (hereafter: 'continuous combat
function')." 32 In other words, the ICRC links the question of
24. Id. at 52-53.
25. While a good starting point for discussion, the ICRC's interpretation should
be more informed by state practice and the realities of military operations. In presenting
authoritative guidance for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) practitioners, the DoD
sought to put forward such an approach in the LAW OF WAR MANUAL, which provides
general guidance and factors for DoD lawyers to use in advising commanders on the law.
The LAW OF WAR MANUAL also provides lists of common examples of activities that
constitute direct participation and activities that do not constitute direct participation
that, I submit, anyone with common sense and a familiarity with military operations can
understand. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.8.3.
26. ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 32-36.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 21-24.
29. Id. at 27-36.
30. Id. at 71 ("[Mlembers of organized armed groups belonging to a nonstate
party to the conflict cease to be civilians for as long as they remain members by virtue of
their continuous combat function.").
31. Id. at 72 ("[W]here individuals go beyond spontaneous, sporadic, or
unorganized direct participation in hostilities and become members of an organized
armed group belonging to a party to the conflict, IHL deprives them of protection against
direct attack for as long as they remain members of that group.").
32. Id. at 33.
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membership to the test for direct participation in hostilities:
"Individuals who continuously accompany or support an organized
armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation
in hostilities, are not members of that group within the meaning of
IHL. Instead, they remain civilians assuming support functions . . . ."
As I mentioned earlier, I think the ICRC's proposed approach is
problematic. A better approach-and the approach that is more
consistent with state practice-is to define members of an armed group
in a much more common sense way-by looking to formal or functional
membership as described above. There are three reasons why this
membership approach is better.
A. LOAC Should Not Treat Members of Nonstate Armed Groups
Better Than Members of State Armed Forces
Protecting organized armed group members to a greater extent
than armed forces members improperly privileges the nonstate party
to a non-international armed conflict. In these conflicts, one side
usually consists of a state's armed forces (whose members lose
protection from attack based on their membership alone)34 and the
other side consists of a nonstate organized armed group (where, the
ICRC argues, only those members who directly participate in
hostilities may be attacked).3 5 Adopting the ICRC's proposed approach
would mean that only one side's supply, human resources, logistics,
intelligence, and legal personnel may be attacked. Ironically, this
would provide a huge and unfair advantage to the side that has not
assumed the burdens of statehood and that lacks right authority36
under international law. In particular, privileging organized armed
groups would provide an unfair advantage to the party that (in many
cases) does not agree to accept the burdens of the law of armed conflict,
such as wearing uniforms or taking other measures to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population.3 7
33. Id. at 34; see also Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed
Groups and the ICRC "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 641, 649 (2010) (arguing that the ICRC has linked the test for
membership in an organized armed group to the test for direct participation in
hostilities).
34. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 5.7.1; ICRC DPH STUDY, supra
note 1, at 30-31.
35. See ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 32-34 (arguing that recruiters,
trainers, and financiers, for example, may not be considered members of an organized
armed group "unless their function additionally includes activities amounting to direct
participation in hostilities").
36. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 1.11.1.1; see also Watkin, supra
note 33, at 672 ("Mhe armed forces of the different parties have dramatically different
rules regarding when their forces can be targeted.").
37. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, § 3.6.3.2.
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So, there would be some perverse incentives if international law
required an elevated standard where a state could attack only a small
portion of an organized armed group while international law exposed
all of that state's forces to attack. On this point, I agree with Professor
Michael Schmitt, who said "[a] more reasoned approach, and one that
better comports with the underlying logic of the distinction between
civilians and organized armed groups, is to simply treat insurgent
fighters and members of the armed forces equally" for the purpose of
assessing their liability to attack.3 8
B. Treating Members of Armed Groups No Better Than Members of
State Armed Forces Is Consistent with Treaty Law and State Practice
Attacking all members of organized armed groups is consistent
with treaty law. It is even consistent with treaties (such as Additional
Protocol I and Additional Protocol II) to which the United States is not
a party. Let me sketch out a bit of this treaty framework, noting that
both Brigadier-General (Retired) Kenneth Watkin and the ICRC
themselves have done very detailed studies of the treaty law in this
area.39
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions recognizes that
parties to non-international armed conflicts will have "armed forces"
that may be attacked unless they have "laid down their arms" or been
placed hors de combat.40
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II recognizes that non-
international armed conflicts take place "between [state] armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups . . . ."41
Article 43 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) describes the "armed
forces" that take part in international armed conflict.42 Under AP I,
the armed forces of a party to the conflict include "all organized armed
38. Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-
International Armed Conflict, 88 INT'L L. STUD. 119, 133 (2012). Of course, for the
purpose of criminal prosecution, insurgent fighters and members of state armed forces
are not treated equally. Persons belonging to nonstate armed groups lack any legal
privilege or immunity from prosecution, but members of state armed forces continue to
benefit from the combatant's privilege. See DoD LAw OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1,
§ 17.4.1.1.
39. Watkin, supra note 33, at 650-655; ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 20-
36.
40. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Watkin, supra note 33, at 653-54
(discussing the differences in references to "armed forces" between Common Article 3
and Additional Protocol II); ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 27-30 (discussing the
meaning of "armed forces" in Common Article 3).
41. Additional Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 1; see also Watkin, supra note 33, at
653-54; ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 27-30.
42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 43, 50.
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forces, groups, and units which are under a command responsible to
that [p]arty . . . ."43
Although AP I is not part of the LOAC applicable to the United
States, AP I and other treaties recognize that members of organized
armed groups are subject to attack based on their membership.44
Nowhere do these treaties require that members of organized armed
groups also meet the direct participation in hostilities standard that
applies to civilians, or that only those persons whose function it is to
participate in hostilities regularly and directly may be considered
members of the group. This means that our approach-to define
membership by looking to formal and functional criteria-is consistent
with LOAC treaties on this subject, even treaties that are not binding
on the United States.
Our position is also supported by state practice. During my time
at CENTCOM, the United States operated as part of a large coalition.
From my perspective, the vast majority of these countries, including
most of our NATO allies, took a very similar approach. For example,
most agreed that identified members of ISIS's military campaign,
including those in roles where they did not directly participate in
hostilities, could be legally targeted as members of an organized armed
group. As a policy matter, states sometimes limit their strikes to more
senior ISIS members, or to those performing the most direct combat
functions. Importantly, that type of targeting prioritization does not
reflect a legal limitation on the ability to target members of organized
armed groups, and therefore does not reflect a state practice that would
contribute to customary international law restrictions on targeting
members of organized armed groups.
C. Treating Members of Armed Groups No Better Than Members of
State Armed Forces Reflects the Reality of Military Operations
Finally, applying the direct participation in hostilities test to
organized armed groups would ignore the reality of how armed
conflicts take place and how armed forces are organized. Recall that
the ICRC's proposed approach claims to be defining membership.45 But
armed forces are not usually organized with members having one
particular job and nonmembers having another. In the U.S. Army, for
example, units are not organized around a distinction between those
43. Id. art. 43; see Watkin, supra note 33, at 650-53; ICRC DPH STUDY, supra
note 1, at 20-26.
44. See ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 22-24 (noting that members of
irregular armed forces are not considered civilians for the purposes of conduct of
hostilities).
45. The Continuous Combat Function rule proposes to define membership in the
organized armed group: "[Under IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership
in an organized armed group is whether a person assumes a . . . 'continuous combat
function' . J... ICRC DPH STUDY, supra note 1, at 22-24 (emphasis added).
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who fight and those who do not. Instead, soldiers from many different
branches and career fields come together in teams-companies,
battalions, brigades, divisions, and other task forces-to accomplish
missions in furtherance of the war effort.
Likewise, our enemies have formed integrated teams to
accomplish common tactical, operational, and strategic goals. We have
been studying groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda for many years. We know
how the groups are organized and how they fight. They are not usually
organized into certain groups that fight and other groups who merely
provide support. Instead, like units in states' armed forces, they are
often organized into functional teams designed to accomplish missions
in support of the group's overall violent objectives. It would make little
sense for a legal rule-especially one that claims to be defining
membership-to carve apart these functional, mission-focused teams
and claim that some team members are not really "members" at all.46
Instead, membership is best defined by who is formally or functionally
a member of the team itself-the organized armed group-not by the
particular role a person fills once they have joined the team.
IV..CONCLUSION
It is vitally important that the United States conducts military
operations lawfully. We recognize that, and we have dedicated the
resources needed to accomplish it. In this Article, I have described how
US forces lawfully attack individuals who are members of organized
armed groups. I have discussed the three-part framework that I have
used to assess whether an attack on a person is lawful, and I have
shown why, subject only to the long-standing exceptions for personnel
exclusively engaged in humanitarian duties and personnel hors de
combat, members of organized armed groups that are party to the
conflict may be attacked. I trust that this practical perspective will be
useful as we work towards a better understanding of the Law of Armed
Conflict.
46. See Watkin, supra note 33, at 676, 680-81 (considering the appropriate
treatment for fighters who are performing non-combat functions, such as cooking).
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